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FAIR WAGES AND HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 






This paper analyzes trade in an asymmetric 2×2×2 world, where the two countries, labelled 
America and Europe, differ in their attitudes towards wage inequality. In both America and 
Europe, fair wage considerations compress differentials between the wages for skilled and 
unskilled workers, leading to involuntary unemployment of unskilled workers in equilibrium. 
European workers are more averse to wage inequality than American workers though, and as a 
consequence Europe is characterised by lower wage differentials as well as higher 
unemployment. Allowing for endogenous skill formation in both countries, the effects of a 
globalization shock – modelled as the entry of newly industrializing countries into the trading 
world – on prices and employment levels are derived. 
 JEL classification: F11, F16. 





University of Nottingham 
School of Economics 
University Park 






Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory has played a prominent role in the recent debate on the
impact of globalization shocks on labor markets in industrialized countries. Arguably,
this so-called “trade-and-wages” debate has sparked the theory’s comeback as a stan-
dard framework of analysis in international trade. As Krugman (2000) puts it succinctly:
“...the Stolper-Samuelson theorem [...] has moved from midterm exams into the heart
of real-world debates over economic policy.” This is ironic given that the eﬀect of glob-
alization on involuntary unemployment appears to be a major concern to policy makers
and the general public, while one of the core assumptions of the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO)
framework are fully ﬂexible factor prices, implying factor market clearing at all times.
Only a small subset of the contributions to the trade-and-wages literature allows for
involuntary unemployment, typically by adding a binding minimum wage for unskilled
labor or a ﬁxed relative wage to the HO framework.1 Using unskilled and skilled workers
as the two factors of production, Krugman (1995) introduced the dichotomy between an
“American” approach, in which wages are fully ﬂexible, and a “European” approach, in
which relative wages are exogenously ﬁxed. In this framework, globalization, modelled
as an increase in labor intensive exports by the group of newly industrializing countries
(NIEs), leads to decrease in the relative wage of unskilled workers in the “American”
model and an increase in the rate of unskilled unemployment in the “European” model.
Importantly, the scenario described by Krugman is one of two alternative worlds with
two countries each: America and the group of NIEs in a ﬂexprice world, Europe and the
group of NIEs in a ﬁxprice world.
Davis (1998) uses the dichotomy introduced by Krugman (1995) and applies it in a
three-country model, consisting of America, Europe and the group of NIEs. America and
Europe trade freely with each other, there are fully ﬂexible factor prices in America and
1In the 2 × 2 Heckscher-Ohlin model, ﬁxing one factor price in units of the numeraire good has the
same eﬀect as ﬁxing relative factor prices, as long as full specialization is ruled out.
1a binding minimum wage rate in Europe. By the logic of the factor price equalization
theorem, free trade between the two countries equalizes factor prices between them, but
only unskilled workers in Europe experience unemployment. In this sense, American
unskilled workers beneﬁt from the European minimum wage, an eﬀect that obviously can
only be accounted for if one assumes that America and Europe are part of the same
trading world. Globalization is modelled as an opening-up of the integrated two-country
world to trade with a third country, namely the group of NIEs. The most important
lesson from Davis’ paper is that with free goods trade the labor market outcomes in each
country are determined by labor market institutions in both. The typical explanations for
country speciﬁc labor market outcomes of globalization by labor economists, as surveyed,
e.g., in Acemoglu (2003), tend to ignore this general equilibrium link working through
integrated goods markets.
The present paper borrows the three-country setup of Davis (1998), but deviates from
it in two important respects. First, the HO production model with exogenous factor
supplies is modiﬁed to allow for endogenous formation of human capital, following the
classic paper by Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983). Second, involuntary unemployment is
due to fair wage considerations on behalf of the workers, as modelled by Akerlof and
Yellen (1990), rather than by an exogenous minimum wage. I will now discuss both
modiﬁcations and their implications, starting with the way involuntary unemployment is
introduced into the model.
There is by now plenty of evidence in support of the notion that involuntary unemploy-
ment can be explained at least in part by the fact that ﬁrms voluntarily pay non-market
clearing wages in order to keep work morale high. Much of the evidence in support of
this hypothesis stems from surveys where business managers were asked about their ﬁrms’
compensation policy, and the results suggest that the morale argument is relevant in both
America and Europe: Agell and Lundborg (1995, 2003) report results of two surveys for
Sweden, whereas Bewley (1999) gives results supporting the morale hypothesis for the
2United States. This behavior of the ﬁrms is compatible with proﬁt maximization if one
allows for work morale to have an inﬂuence on the workers’ eﬀort, and hence on labor
productivity. In a recent study, Fehr and Falk (1999) examined the same question in the
laboratory, with striking results: In experiments where eﬀort was a choice variable of the
workers, ﬁrms’ wage oﬀers were higher on average than workers’ wage oﬀers, and in most
cases where underbidding by workers occurred ﬁrms refused to accept the lower oﬀers.
A second type of evidence suggesting that the minimum wage model does not give an
accurate framework to discuss involuntary unemployment comes from the “wage curve”
literature, as described in Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1995). Blanchﬂower and Oswald
present evidence from a broad set of countries for a negative equilibrium relation between
the rate of unemployment and the wage rate. In contrast, as pointed out by them, the
combination of a perfectly competitive labor market with a binding minimum wage would
lead to a positively sloped equilibrium relation between these two variables.
A theoretical framework compatible with these results is the fair wage model by Akerlof
and Yellen (1990).2 Here, we develop a two-country-two-sector variant of their model and
use it as a framework for the analysis. Given the empirical evidence just cited, I allow
for the fair wage mechanism to be present in both America and Europe. But due to
diﬀerent attitudes towards inequality in the two countries, to be spelt out below, America
has a lower rate of unemployment in equilibrium than Europe. This appears to be a
more appropriate description of the asymmetry between the two countries than the strict
dichotomy used by Krugman (1995) and Davis (1998).
The general equilibrium link pointed out by Davis (1998) has a strong implication in
any framework with a HO production structure: even in the presence of labor market
asymmetries between Europe and America, global shocks – i.e. shocks that hit both
countries equally – cannot lead to divergent wage paths between them. This is true both
2They build on earlier contributions by Solow (1979) and Akerlof (1982) where work morale was
stressed as a reason for paying non-market clearing wages.
3for a globalization shock as described above and for a global technology shock. In a HO
framework with diversiﬁed production, divergent wage paths can only be generated by
country-speciﬁc technology shocks. Clearly, this strong result no longer holds if we modify
the HO model to allow for the quality of factors to be diﬀerent between countries, and
for a global shock to aﬀect the quality of factors in a country speciﬁc way. It is a model
of this type that is developed in this paper.
A straightforward way to incorporate international quality diﬀerences between factors
in a HO framework is provided by the model of Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983). In
their paper, the number of skilled and unskilled workers as well as the quality of skilled
workers is determined endogenously. With diﬀerent incentives to acquire skill between
countries, this model allows wage paths to diverge. In the present paper, the incentive
to become skilled diﬀers between countries because unemployment rates for unskilled
workers are diﬀerent. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a
brief non-technical discussion of the mechanisms driving the analysis. Section 3 presents
the basic fair wage model. Section 4 embeds the fair wage model into a general equilibrium
framework of a closed economy. Section 5 derives the equilibrium for the asymmetric two-
country trading world and describes the eﬀect that the globalization shock has on the two
countries. Section 6 concludes.
2 Non-technical Discussion
The main contribution of the paper is to analyze the eﬀects of a globalization shock on an
asymmetric two-country world (“Europe and America”) with national factor markets but
goods markets which are already fully integrated before the globalization shock occurs.
This shock is modelled as the two-country world opening up to trade with a previously
isolated third country (“China”). At the goods prices of the pre-shock equilibrium, the
third country is a net supplier of unskilled labor intensive goods.
4Production technology in the two integrated countries is identical to the standard
Heckscher-Ohlin model, the factors being skilled and unskilled labor. Unskilled workers
in both countries are assumed to provide less than the normal eﬀort if they perceive their
wages to be too low relative to their skilled colleagues’ wages. In the model, there is one
crucial diﬀerence between America and Europe: The attitudes of workers in Europe are
more egalitarian than those of their American colleagues in the sense that they dislike
wage inequality to a greater extent. While skill premiums in both countries are smaller
than in a perfectly competitive labor market, they are smaller in Europe than in America,
and involuntary unemployment of unskilled workers in Europe is higher in equilibrium.
In both countries, all individuals are born with equal abilities, and they decide at
birth whether to acquire skill or to remain unskilled. The composition of the labor force
in each of the countries is then determined by the condition that the present values
of skilled and unskilled workers’ expected net lifetime incomes be equal. This implies
that net wages of skilled workers during their (shorter) working life exceed expected net
wages of unskilled workers. In Europe, the prospect of being potentially unemployed
when unskilled does ceteris paribus give workers an additional incentive to acquire skill,
as compared to America, where the rate of unemployment is lower. With decreasing
marginal returns to skill acquisition (think, e.g., of overcrowding eﬀects in Universities),
this implies that the skilled workforce is on average less well trained in Europe than in
America. Because of the Heckscher-Ohlin production technology being the same in both
countries, free goods trade equalizes factor prices for labor in eﬃciency units. However,
skilled workers in America receive a higher wage than their European colleagues because
they are higher quality on average.
The globalization shock puts downward pressure on the price of unskilled labor inten-
sive goods, and in the adjustment process has knock-on eﬀects on wages for both skilled
and unskilled workers in America and Europe, the composition of each country’s work
5force, and the unemployment rates in both countries.3
3 The Fair Wage Model
Involuntary unemployment is explained by a variant of the fair wage model developed
by Akerlof and Yellen (1990). The adaptations made serve the sole purpose of making
their one-sector model work in a two-sector general equilibrium framework. At each point
in time, the two factors unskilled labor L and skilled labor H are supplied inelastically,
and both types of workers are able to choose their eﬀort at work. The wage for unskilled
workers is denoted by wL. The wage for skilled workers varies with their skill level, and
for a worker with skill level q it is given by qwH, where wH is the wage for one eﬃciency
unit of skilled labor. The eﬀort supplied by unskilled and skilled workers, respectively, is

















H are the fair wages for the two groups of workers. This means that
workers provide the normal level of eﬀort, which is normalized to one, if they are paid
at least their fair wage. If they are paid less then their fair wage, they reduce eﬀort
proportionately.
For each of the two groups, the fair wage has two determinants: ﬁrst the market wage
of the respective other group, and second the remuneration they could expect outside
their own ﬁrm, taking into account that they might be unemployed with a probability
3Davis and Reeve (2002) combine the minimum wage model of Davis (1998) with the Findlay and
Kierzkowski (1983) model. In their paper, the globalization shock leaves goods prices constant, and the
American labor market is isolated from the globalization shock, as in Davis (1998).
6that is equal to the factor-speciﬁc rate of unemployment.4 Hence, we have
w
∗
L = βqwH + (1 − β)(1 − UL)wL (1)
qw
∗
H = βwL + (1 − β)(1 − UH)qwH (2)
where UL and UH are the factor-speciﬁc rates of unemployment, and β is the weight
attached to the respective other factors remuneration in one factor’s determination of its
fair wage. Following Akerlof and Yellen (1990), we assume that ﬁrms choose to pay fair
wages if doing so does not diminish their proﬁts.
As shown below, it is an equilibrium outcome of the present model that the wage
for skilled workers exceeds the wage of unskilled workers, i.e., qwH > wL. Under this
condition, it is straightforward to see that the following must hold in equilibrium:
UL > UH = 0 (3)
qwH > qw
∗
H > wL = w
∗
L (4)
eL = eH = 1 (5)
i.e., there is a strictly positive rate of unemployment U = UL for unskilled workers but
full employment for skilled workers, the fair wage is binding only for unskilled workers,
and both types of workers provide the normal eﬀort.5
Using (3) to (5), one can derive an equilibrium relationship between the wage diﬀer-
ential and the rate of unemployment. Using ω ≡ wL/wH to denote the wage diﬀerential
4Instead of the expected wage rate, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) use the (hypothetical) market clearing
wage rate of the respective group as the second determinant of the fair wage. The two approaches
yield similar results as in the presence of involuntary unemployment for the respective factor both its
expected wage and its market clearing wage lie below the actual wage. The approach used here is more
straightforward to apply in a multi-sector model though.
5These results are the same as in the model of Akerlof and Yellen (1990), but for the fact that in their
framework one has to assume (quite reasonably) that skilled labor is the higher paid whereas it is derived
endogenously in the present paper.





β + (1 − β)U
. (6)
Following Akerlof and Yellen (1990), (6) is called the fair wage constraint. For a given
value of the attitudes parameter β, the fair wage constraint describes equilibrium com-
binations between the rate of unemployment of unskilled workers and the relative gross





(β + (1 − β)U)
2 < 0 and
∂2α
∂U2 =
2β (1 − β)
2
(β + (1 − β)U)
3 > 0,
and hence the fair wage constraint is negatively sloped and convex in ω
q − U-space, i.e.
higher rates of unemployment (for unskilled workers) lead ﬁrms to paying them relatively
lower wages. This is because with higher rates of unemployment, the fair wage needed
to elicit normal eﬀort from unskilled workers is lower. Consider now the extreme cases
U = 0 and U = 1 where we have
ω
q





   
U=1
= β.
Hence, wages can vary over the range (β,1), and the model gives us an intermediate case
between full wage ﬂexibility and a ﬁxed wage diﬀerential.6 A graphical representation of
the fair wage constraint is given in ﬁgure 1.
4 General Equilibrium in the Closed Economy
We now characterize the general equilibrium in a closed economy that is characterized by
some degree of egalitarian attitudes among workers, i.e. 0 < β < 1. The setup follows
the model of Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983), to which we add the fair wage model of
the labor market just described. It is assumed that at each point in time N identical









Figure 1: The Fair Wage Constraint
individuals are born that each live for T > 1 periods. At birth they decide whether to
remain unskilled and take up work immediately or to train for θ periods and then, being
skilled now, work until they die. The length of education θ is assumed to be exogenous,
and without further loss of generality it is normalized to one. The economy is stationary,
and at each point in time it is populated by L = WT unskilled workers, a fraction (1−U)
of which is employed, H = E(T −1) skilled workers, and E students. W = N −E denotes
the number of people who at each instant take up work immediately after birth. Skill
formation occurs according to the production function
Q = F(K,E), (7)
where K is the exogenous capital stock speciﬁc to the education sector. F(·) is assumed to
be linearly homogenous in (K,E) with partial derivatives ∂Q/∂E > 0 and ∂2Q/∂E2 < 0.
Consequently, we can write q = f(k) with k = K/E as the educational capital per student
9and q = Q/E as the number of skill units per student. Let h denote the economy-wide
skill intensity of production, measured in eﬃciency units. We then have
h =
Q(T − 1)
(N − E)(1 − U)T
. (8)
The equilibrium skill intensity h is determined by the condition that the present values
of expected net lifetime incomes for skilled and unskilled labor are equal. Assuming that










where r is the rate of interest, which equals the exogenous rate of time preference and is
therefore constant in equilibrium. Using
∂Q
∂E = f(k) − f0(k)k, this can be rewritten as
∂Q
∂E
= ω(1 − U)∆ (9)
with ∆ ≡ (1 − e−rT)/(e−r − e−rT) > 1. Following the assumptions we have made earlier,
∆ is a constant.7 Note that the net wage of skilled workers is equal to
∂Q
∂EwH.
The economy is assumed to produce the two goods X and Y , with skilled and unskilled
labor as the only inputs. Good Y serves as the numeraire and is assumed to be unskilled
labor intensive relative to X at all common factor price ratios. Product markets are
perfectly competitive, and production functions in both sectors exhibit constant returns
to scale. Finally, preferences over goods are assumed to be homothetic with both X
and Y being essential in consumption. With p as the relative price of X the zero proﬁt
conditions for the two sectors are given by the equality of goods prices to unit costs, i.e.
cX(wL,wH) = p cY(wL,wH) = 1.
7See Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983) for a step-by-step derivation of the analogous equation to (9)
in the full employment variant of the model. All that distinguishes the present case from theirs is the
replacement of wL by wL(1 − U).
10Hence, as in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model factor prices depend only on the relative
goods price and we can write
ω = ψ(p) with ψ
0(p) < 0 (10)
where the sign of ψ0 is implied by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem in combination with
the factor intensity assumption. Furthermore, we have:
p = λ(h) with λ
0(h) < 0 (11)
For any value of h, (11) gives the equilibrium relative goods price. The sign of λ0 follows
from the assumptions of good X being skill intensive and consumers having homothetic
preferences. Under these assumptions, the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem ensures that the
higher the skill-to-labor ratio of a country, the lower is its autarky price of the skill
intensive good. Together, equations (6) to (11) determine the endogenous variables p, ω,
U, E, Q and h.
Equilibrium for the closed fair wage economy can be illustrated in an E−U diagram.8












(N − E)(1 − U)T
= 0. (12)
As shown in the appendix, implicit diﬀerentiation of (12) gives dU/dE < 0. The intuition
for this is as follows. An increase in E leads ceteris paribus to an increase in the number of
skilled workers and consequently to an increase in the relative supply of the skill intensive
good. The relative price of the skill intensive good will therefore fall, leading – via the
Stolper-Samuelson link – to an increase in ω. With perfectly ﬂexible wages, this process
would continue until p has fallen suﬃciently for consumers to be willing to consume
the increased supply of the skill intensive good. The fair wage constraint prevents this
from happening, and part of the adjustment occurs through a decrease in the rate of
8Davis and Reeve (2002) use a diagram of this type to describe equilibrium in the case of minimum
wages.
11unemployment, i.e. an increase in the number of unskilled workers. Hence, goods and
factor price changes are dampened in comparison to the standard full employment model.
A second relation between E and U can be derived by combining the fair wage con-
straint (6) with the condition for career path indiﬀerence, equation (9). To this end, we









(1 − U)∆, (9a)
where η is the elasticity of educational output with respect to the number of students.
With perfect competition in the education sector, η is equal to the share of E in educa-
tional output – i.e., the fraction of educational output that can be appropriated by the
students. There is a straightforward interpretation for this representation of the career
path indiﬀerence condition: ceteris paribus, whenever the gross wage diﬀerential becomes
smaller (ω/q increases), the share of educational output appropriated by the students has
to increase in order to keep workers indiﬀerent between being skilled and unskilled. Now,






= α(U)(1 − U)∆, (13)





∆[α0(U)(1 − U) − α(U)]
T 0 ⇐⇒ η
0(E) S 0. (14)
Hence the sign of the equilibrium relation between E and U along the career path indif-
ference locus hinges crucially on how the students’ share in educational output changes
with the number of students. With a constant value of η (i.e. the case where F(·) is
a Cobb-Douglas production function), the rate of unemployment compatible with career
path indiﬀerence does not change following a change in E. If η increases with the number
of students, the equilibrium relation between E and U along the career path indiﬀerence
locus is negative, and vice versa. One can show that with a linearly homogenous knowl-
edge production function, as assumed, η decreases in the number of students if and only
12if the elasticity of substitution ε between K and E is smaller than one. Hence, the career
path indiﬀerence locus (13) slopes upward in the inelastic case (ε < 1) and downward in
the elastic case (ε > 1). Figure 2 illustrates the determination of equilibrium for diﬀering
assumptions on the elasticity of substitution ε (or, equivalently, diﬀering assumptions on
η0). While the goods market equilibrium locus (12), denoted by GM, is downward sloping,
the slope of the career path indiﬀerence locus (13) may have either sign: CPI1 shows the
inelastic case (ε < 1,η0 < 0), CPI2 describes the Cobb-Douglas case (ε = 1,η0 = 0), and




























Figure 2: Equilibrium in the Fair Wage Economy
Consider now a globalization shock hitting the previously closed fair wage economy.
The shock is modelled as opening up to trade with the rest of world that at the relative
autarky goods price of the fair wage economy is a net supplier of the unskilled labor
intensive good. Formally, equation (11) is replaced by







13where G stands for the degree of globalization vis-a-vis net suppliers of unskilled labor
intensive goods that the fair wage economy faces. The modelling is very general in that
it allows for the degree of globalization to be determined by the rest of the world. For
example, China’s becoming an exporter of unskilled labor intensive goods on a relevant
scale would be one possible development captured by an increase in G. Ceteris paribus,
this increases the relative price of the skill intensive good in the previously closed fair
wage economy.
From inspection of equations (12) and (13) one can see that G inﬂuences the former
but not the latter. Hence, changes in G shift the GM locus in ﬁgure 2, but not the CPI














(N − E)(1 − U)T
= 0, (16)
and implicit diﬀerentiation shows that dU/dG > 0 (see the appendix). In ﬁgure 2, an
increase in G therefore shifts the GM locus outwards. Hence, we have the following:
Proposition 1. The globalization shock increases the number of skilled workers in the
fair wage economy. The unemployment rate of unskilled workers increases (decreases,
remains constant) if the elasticity of substitution of the education production function is
smaller than one (larger than one, equal to one).
It is straightforward to go on and derive the eﬀects of globalization on the other model
variables. Given that the focus of the paper is on the eﬀects globalization has on an
asymmetric two-country world, we refrain from doing so here.
5 The Asymmetric Two-Country World
5.1 General Equilibrium
Based on the description of the closed fair wage economy in the previous section, we can
now derive equilibrium for an asymmetric two-country world of “Europe” and “America”.
14The diﬀerent attitudes between America and Europe with respect to wage inequality are
captured here by assuming that 0 < βA < βE < 1, where βA and βE apply to America
and Europe, respectively. Assuming that the two countries share the same technology in
both X and Y production, and that they both produce both goods and trade them freely
with each other, factor prices for eﬃciency units of skilled and unskilled labor will be
equalized internationally. In order to focus on the eﬀect of diﬀering attitudes, we assume
America and Europe to be identical in all other respects, including endowments with K








i) i = E,A (70)
h =
(QA + QE)(T − 1)
[(NA − EA)(1 − UA) + (NE − EE)(1 − UE)]T
(80)
∂Qi
∂Ei = ω(1 − U
i)∆ i = E,A (90)
as well as (10) and (15). In general, the superscript E denotes variables speciﬁc to Europe,
whereas the superscript A denotes variables speciﬁc to America. Equations (60) are the
fair wage constraint for Europe and America, respectively. Equations (70) describe the
knowledge production in Europe and America, respectively, the production function being
the same for both countries. The average skill intensity of world production is given by
(80), and (90) are the conditions for equality of expected lifetime incomes for skilled and
unskilled workers in Europe and America. Together, these nine equations determine the
endogenous variables p, ω, h, EE, EA, QE, QA, UE and UA.
It is now straightforward to show the following:
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the unemployment rate among unskilled workers is higher
in Europe than in America, and the skill premium in terms of both gross and net wages
is lower.


















Figure 3: European and American Fair Wage Constraints
EA ≥ EE, qA ≤ qE, and ω/qA ≥ ω/qE (from (90)). However, UA ≥ UE ⇒ ω/qA < ω/qE
from (60) and the assumption βE > βA, which is a contradiction to the above. Hence, we
have UE > UA.
Now, UE > UA ⇒ ω/qE > ω/qA (from (90)), which is consistent with (60) and the





The two fair wage constraints are depicted in ﬁgure 3. Let A be the equilibrium combina-
tion of U and ω/q in America. Then, proposition 2 says that equilibrium in Europe will
lie somewhere between points B and C.9
Corollary 1. Gross and net wages of skilled workers are higher in America than in
Europe.
9Note that proposition 2 does not depend on the elasticity of substitution in the education sector.
16Proof. Wages for unskilled workers are equalized through trade. This, together with
proposition 2 immediately gives the result.
The economic intuition is straightforward: Ceteris paribus, the higher unemployment
rate for unskilled workers in Europe gives them an additional incentive to become skilled,
thereby reducing the average quality of skilled workers and hence the wage they receive.
Using proposition 2, we can derive the trade pattern for the two-country world. Let













2 − EA)(1 − UA)
#
> 0 (17)
because UE > UA ⇒ EE > EA ⇒ QE > QA. Hence, the average skill intensity of
production in Europe is higher than the average skill intensity of production in America.
With identical homothetic preferences and costless goods trade, the skill intensity of
consumption is equalized across countries. Europe therefore exports the skill intensive
good and imports the unskilled labor intensive good.
5.2 Comparative Statics
The eﬀects of a globalization shock on the asymmetric two-country world can be analyzed
by using a ﬁgure analogous to ﬁgure 2. In particular, we derive the goods market equi-
librium locus and the career path indiﬀerence locus for Europe in UE −EE-space, taking
into account the interaction between the two countries’ factor markets working through







(QA + QE)(T − 1)
[(NA − EA)(1 − UA) + (NE − EE)(1 − UE)]T
= 0. (18)
where ω = ω(
QEα(UE)
EE ). It is shown in the appendix that the GM-locus is downward
sloping in UE − EE-space.10 The economic logic is analogous to the logic for the closed
economy described in section 4 above.
10As ω changes endogenously along the GM-locus, so do EA, UA and QA.





which is identical to (13) but for the fact that EE and UE have been substituted for E
and U. Consequently, the condition on the slope of the CPI-locus is completely analogous
to the condition for the one-country world: It is upward sloping in UE − EE space if
and only if the substitution elasticity of the education production function is smaller
than one, implying η0 < 0. The equilibrium values of UE and EE can now be derived
graphically. Figure 4 focuses on the inelastic case (CPI1) and the Cobb-Douglas case
(CPI2), respectively, as the elastic case does not appear to be relevant from an empirical
point of view. EE
0 and UE


















Figure 4: Globalization Shock to the Two-Country World
Now, we analyze the eﬀect of a globalization shock on the asymmetric two-country
world. As explained above, the idea is that of a previously closed newly industrializing
18country, “China”, to enter trade with America and Europe. All that is assumed is that
at the pre-globalization relative goods price, China is a net supplier of the unskilled la-
bor intensive good.11 In terms of ﬁgure 4, one can show (see the appendix) that the
globalization shock shifts the GM-locus outwards. That is, for a given number of stu-
dents in Europe an increase in the European unemployment rate is required in order to
restore goods market equilibrium, allowing for the induced adjustment in the American
labor market. The new equilibrium values are (UE
0 ,EE
2 ) in the Cobb-Douglas case and
(UE
1 ,EE
1 ) in the inelastic case. Hence, the globalization shock increases the number of
skilled workers in Europe in both cases considered. Clearly, an analogous analysis would
yield a qualitatively identical result for America. Using this result, we are now in a po-
sition to give a comprehensive description of equilibrium changes brought about by the
globalization shock in American and European labor markets. The Cobb-Douglas case
gives a set of useful reference results:
Proposition 3. With a Cobb-Douglas production function in the education sector, the
globalization shock leaves the rate of unemployment among unskilled workers as well as
the gross and net wage diﬀerentials constant in both America and Europe.
Proof. Start by dividing both sides of (90) by qi for i = A,E. In the Cobb-Douglas case,
the LHS of the resulting equations is constant, and hence so are Ui and ω/qi. From (90),
with ∆ and Ui constant, so have to be the net wage diﬀerentials ω/
∂Qi
∂Ei.
Intuitively, the globalization shock as a negative shock to the demand for unskilled
workers gives an incentive for unskilled workers in both countries to become skilled. With
a Cobb-Douglas production function in education, these supply side responses are such
that the unemployment rates are kept on their respective old equilibrium levels. Given
the fair wage constraint, proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms then choose to hold the gross wage
diﬀerential constant. The increase of the wage diﬀerential in eﬃciency units is exactly
11No assumptions on China’s production technology or factor endowments are made.
19oﬀset by a decrease in the average quality of the skilled workers, i.e., the number of skill
units per skilled worker.
Given that the data on changes in wage inequality, as presented e.g. in Acemoglu
(2003), show an increase in gross wage diﬀerentials in America and – at least in some
cases – in Europe as well, the results of the Cobb-Douglas benchmark case are at odds
with the empirical evidence. We now turn to the inelastic case. This yields the following
results:
Proposition 4. With the elasticity of substitution in the education sector smaller than
one, the globalization shock
(i) increases the rate of unemployment among unskilled workers as well as gross wage
diﬀerentials in both America and Europe,
(ii) decreases skill premia in terms of net wages in America and Europe.
Proof. Again, start by dividing both sides of (90) by qi for i = A,E. With ε < 1, an
increase in Ei now leads to a decrease in the LHS of the resulting equations, and hence
to an increase in Ui as well as a decrease in ω/qi (i.e. an increase in the gross wage
diﬀerential). From (90), an increase in Ui implies an increase in ω/
∂Qi
∂Ei (i.e. a decrease in
the net wage diﬀerential).
Intuitively, with an elasticity of substitution smaller than in the Cobb-Douglas refer-
ence case, the supply side reaction induced by the negative demand shock to unskilled
labor is not as strong, and hence the economy settles down at a higher rate of unemploy-
ment among unskilled workers. Via the fair wage constraint, this implies a higher skill
premium in terms of gross wages. The career path indiﬀerence condition requires that
the increase in the rate of unemployment for the unskilled (which makes skill acquisition
more attractive) is accompanied in the new equilibrium by a decrease in the skill premium
in terms of net wages (which makes skill acquisition less attractive). Without further re-
strictions on the production function in the education sector, it is unclear whether the
20unemployment or wage diﬀerentials between Europe and America do widen or shrink. It
is clear from proposition 2 however, that the globalization shock leaves the ranking of
Europe and America in terms of wage diﬀerentials and unemployment rates unchanged.
6 Conclusion
In the one-cone HO model, modiﬁed as to allow for labor market asymmetries between
countries, a globalization shock cannot be reconciled with internationally divergent wage
paths. Due to the basic factor price equalization property of the model, country-speciﬁc
technology shocks are the only possible source of changes in international factor price
diﬀerentials. Empirical evidence cited above supports the idea that fair wage consider-
ations are important to ﬁrms’ wage setting in both America and Europe. Building on
this evidence, the present paper shows that a globalization shock can have diﬀerential
eﬀects on both unemployment and wage rates in America and Europe if an asymmetric
two-country version of the fair wage model by Akerlof and Yellen (1990) is merged with
the Findlay-Kierzkowski model, which allows for endogenous changes of factor supplies in
a HO framework. It is shown that the production technology in the education sector plays
a crucial role for the adjustment process, because it determines the extent to which an
induced supply side adjustment in the labor market compensates the demand side shock.
Consequently, a further source for diﬀerential adjustment to the globalization shock, not
explored here, would be international diﬀerences in education technology.
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21Appendix
The GM-locus in the Closed Fair Wage Economy
In order to facilitate notation, we introduce q = g(E,K) with ∂g/∂E < 0. Then, implic-

















and hence the GM-locus is downward sloping in U − E-space in the closed fair wage















and hence opening up the closed fair wage economy to globalization shifts the GM-locus
upwards in U − E-space.
The GM-locus in the Two-Country World
In analogy to the previous section, we use qi = g(Ei,Ki), i = A,E, with ∂g/∂Ei < 0.































































































































Hence the GM-locus is downward sloping in UE−EE-space in the asymmetric two-country



































23and hence opening up the two-country world to globalization shifts the GM-locus upwards
in UE − EE-space.
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